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Essay 
Authority and Meaning 
LAURENCE CLAUS 
This conference contribution celebrates Richard Kay’s contention that a 
sound theory of legal meaning depends on a sound theory of legal status. Contrary 
to Kay, I conclude that identifying law’s true source reveals that we should seek 
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Authority and Meaning 
LAURENCE CLAUS * 
INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, Richard Kay reminded us that where we look for words’ 
meaning should depend on why we are paying attention to them. 
Identifying the meaning of a constitution, he contended, cannot be 
disconnected from the source of its status as law. This contribution to the 
celebration praises Kay’s insight that a sound theory of legal meaning 
depends on a sound theory of legal status. While acclaiming that 
conclusion, we will examine Kay’s account of what makes the United 
States Constitution our law and notice how adjusting our vision of the 
Constitution’s legal status alters our approach to identifying the 
Constitution’s meaning.  
I. KAY’S VISION OF AUTHORITY AND MEANING 
For Kay, “[t]he central problem with the original public meaning view 
of constitutional interpretation is that it severs the connection between the 
Constitution’s rules and the authority that makes us care about those rules 
in the first place.”1 Kay argues that “[t]he normative force of any legal rule 
is, first and foremost, the consequence of regard for the lawmaker,”2 and 
that “[n]o constitution—no posited norm of any kind—can succeed if it is 
not regarded as the authentic command of a legitimate lawmaker.”3  
Whence comes the legal status of the United States Constitution? Kay 
locates it in the decisions of state ratifying conventions that were 
understood by the founding generation to reflect “the will of ‘the people.’”4 
Whether or not characterizing those decisions in that way is plausible, 
“[t]he critical point,” according to Kay, is “that the United States 
Constitution, like any other piece of legislation, derives its force from 
regard for the circumstances of its enactment.”5 Kay concludes that 
                                                                                                                     
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. 
1 Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 703, 714 (2009). 
2 Id. at 715. 
3 Id.  
4 Id. at 716.  
5 Id. at 717.  
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“recourse to the original intentions provides a link that is essential to the 
legitimacy of constitutional judicial review.”6 
II. THE NATURE OF LAW 
Let us look a little closer at the conceptual building blocks of Kay’s 
argument for treating the quest for legal meaning as a quest for lawmaker 
intent. Among these elements, we can see authority, legitimacy, normative 
force, and success. Do these elements each describe something we have 
real reasons to care about, and if so, do they describe different things or are 
they really just alternative ways of saying the same thing? Let’s start with 
success. We clearly have to care about that. What makes a constitution 
successful? As we are considering success en route to a theory of 
constitutional meaning, it would be question begging to treat conformity to 
the results of applying a particular theory of constitutional meaning as our 
criterion of success. But we can surely say that inducing conformity in 
some rational sense is what success at being a constitution—indeed success 
at being any sort of law—involves.  
What causes conformity to law? Many things might in various 
circumstances—well-made law will often track what we would have, or 
could acquire, moral reasons to do or not do anyway. But what is the 
common denominator reason that we can confidently call conformity to 
law because it is law? In search of that, we could peel back the legal layers 
to reach the core of a legal system, what H. L. A. Hart called its “rule of 
recognition.”7 What makes that successful? Hart ultimately concluded that 
the rule of recognition is a convention—that its reality as a progenitor of 
law in a community depends on a shared understanding and expectation 
among strategically situated members of that community, those Hart called 
“officials.”8 Officials, including official dispute resolvers, owe their legal 
status to their general conformity to a shared understanding and 
expectation about what counts as law and who count as lawgivers. Their 
understanding is accurate, their expectation is reasonable, because that 
understanding and expectation are shared. Each actor looks from side to 
side at what others are likely to do and to expect. As in the formation of all 
                                                                                                                     
6 Id. at 704. 
7 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. 6 (2d ed. 1994). 
8 Id. at 116–17. “Rules are conventional social practices if the general conformity of a group to 
them is part of the reasons which its individual members have for acceptance. . . . [C]onventional social 
rules . . . include, besides ordinary social customs (which may or may not be recognized as having legal 
force), certain important legal rules including the rule of recognition, which is in effect a form of 
judicial customary rule existing only if it is accepted and practised in the law-identifying and 
law-applying operations of the courts.” Id. at 255–56. 
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social customs, the understanding and expectations so formed are 
self-vindicating and self-fulfilling.9  
If the core of a legal system emerges through shared expectations, if its 
essence is social custom, then doesn’t the whole legal system grow forth 
from shared expectations, from social custom? Our following particular 
persons pedigreed by that system as lawgivers, including constitutional 
lawgivers, would then be not a departure from custom, but an extension of 
custom, morally supported by whatever morally supports following 
custom. Customs of following leaders would just be custom-based fast 
tracks to many more customs. Our underlying reason for following law 
“because it is law” would be the thing that makes it law, namely its success 
at self-fulfillingly expressing what people in our community are likely to 
do and to expect, including how various among them are likely to respond 
to how we act—for example, by expressing disapproval of nonconformity 
or even punishing us for it. That weighty (though not preemptive) and 
law-specific reason for following law would be not only about eliciting 
approval and avoiding punishment, but more deeply about our need to have 
the shared expectations that law alone can provide. The shared 
expectations that law gives us are the only way we can live together in 
large groups, with people with whom we have no personal intimacy. Those 
expectations depend on a feedback loop to and from our general 
conformity to them. Law’s ongoing reality in our lives depends on our 
general conformity to it, without which its constitutive expectations 
evaporate. Our realizing and acting on that understanding of our 
circumstances, our choice to live in a way that enhances our prospects of 
maintaining the system that lets us live together well, distinguishes our 
disposition from that which might appear in crude caricatures of legal 
realism. Legal systems are multifaceted prediction systems that we have 
strong moral reason to preserve, because we live inside them. Hart rightly 
rejected the notion that statements of obligation are just predictions,10 but a 
prediction system can produce moral obligation if there is good in having 
that system. And the general conformity that enables our shared 
expectations depends upon shared understanding of what the law is. 
Without a way to identify and share legal meaning, we would, as Jürgen 
Habermas observes, have to give up on “the very function of law, to 
stabilize expectations.”11  
                                                                                                                     
9 Jules Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in 
HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 99, 121 (Jules Coleman 
ed., 2001) (“They are, in a sense, officials in virtue of that rule, but they are not officials prior to it (in 
either the factual or the logical sense). Their behaviour makes the rule possible; but it is the rule that 
makes them officials.”). See also Richard S. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 191–
92 (1981) (considering Hart’s descriptive account of the rule of recognition). 
10 HART, supra note 7, at 84. 
11 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY 
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III. CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Let us return to Kay’s bottom line, “that the United States Constitution, 
like any other piece of legislation, derives its force from regard for the 
circumstances of its enactment.”12 What is the distinctively legal nature of 
that regard? What perception of the acts of the ratifying conventions 
turned the Philadelphia document into the law of the land? Kay notes a 
range of rationales that might potentially be cited within a group to explain 
that group’s regard for the circumstances that generated its law:  
Those circumstances may be compelling because they 
embody what is thought to be the will of the people. Or they 
may be thought to incorporate special safeguards that filter 
out unsound decisions. Or they may be perceived as eliciting 
the judgments of the wisest members of society or the 
holiest.13 
In such a miscellany of potential rationales we might detect a scent of 
rationalization. The world abounds with failed constitutions for which such 
nice things could similarly be said. However much people may have paid 
lip service to, and even believed in, approbations of these kinds, their 
applicability, real or apparent, cannot in itself explain what makes the 
difference between success and failure at becoming and staying law. Only 
one explanation supplies a universally necessary and sufficient criterion for 
becoming and staying law, and that is the explanation of Hart’s rule of 
recognition. Constitutions become real, words become law, when enough 
people in a community expect that enough other people in that community 
will treat them as law, that is, will treat them as expressing what people in 
the group are likely to do and to expect. Words become law when they 
succeed self-fulfillingly in expressing what is custom for us. And that turns 
completely on how we understand and expect most others in our group to 
be regarding those words. That is the crucial regard achieved by the 
circumstances of the United States Constitution’s enactment. Not that the 
process of adoption was really or apparently the most morally worthy 
one—its revolutionary departure from the amendment rules of the existing 
system was vociferously condemned by opponents14—but that those 
                                                                                                                     
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 201 (William Rehg trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. 1996) (1992) (“A flat 
revocation of any guarantees of legal certainty leads to the conclusion that the legal system must 
ultimately give up the idea of satisfying the very function of law, to stabilize expectations. The realists 
cannot explain how the functionally necessary accomplishments of the legal system are compatible 
with a radical skepticism on the part of legal experts.”). 
12 Kay, supra note 1, at 717.  
13 Id. (internal citation omitted). 
14 See, e.g., 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 189 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS] (Luther Martin’s, “Genuine Information,” which he delivered to the 
Maryland legislature on November 29, 1787: “The same reasons which you now urge for destroying 
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circumstances of enactment made it what most everyone was thereafter 
likely to treat as the thing. Initially fragile expectations about the 
Constitution’s status strengthened as, month by month, people continued to 
act as if it was going to be the thing by doing the acts that it contemplated: 
holding elections, convening, governing. We could call that emerging 
regard . . . the internal point of view.15   
Kay contends that “[t]his cannot be the whole story. There is always a 
reason why an attempted assertion of power is effective.”16 In particular, he 
concludes that “[i]n the case of a constitution, it will be essential that there 
exists an explicit or implicit determination by some significant part of the 
population that the makers of the constitution are or were an appropriate 
source of constitutional rules.”17  
In evaluating whether others are likely to follow, we have reason to ask 
whether what is being held out, and the way it is being held out, make it 
something others are likely to follow. Relevant to that enquiry are whether 
the content looks like a recipe for good government and whether those who 
came up with it received the opportunity to do so in a good way. But those 
things are relevant to whether purported law becomes and stays law only to 
the extent they help inform people’s understanding of what others are 
likely to do and to expect. Members of a community might undertake a 
morally impeccable process of consultative and representative constitution 
writing. That community might engage in an act of indisputably 
democratic adoption of a text that exudes virtue in applying our best 
understandings of what will maximize the odds of good governance. None 
of that will be reason enough for us to follow, if we do not think that others 
are likely to do so too. In deciding whether to follow purported law, we 
have no reason to step out and try to make the sound of one hand clapping. 
Being seen as “an appropriate source of constitutional rules”18 is not 
sufficient to turn that source’s words into law. But is it necessary? 
No. We have strong reason to follow a lot of purported law that comes 
from bad leaders who came into leadership in bad ways if that is what most 
others in our community are likely to do and to expect. Bad governance is 
of course more likely to trigger a moment of revolutionary transition. But 
those moments arise infrequently and unpredictably precisely because they 
depend on concerted mass action without the coordinative guidance of the 
                                                                                                                     
our present federal government, may be urged for abolishing the system, which you now propose to 
adopt; and as the method prescribed by the Articles of Confederation is now totally disregarded by you, 
as little regard may be shown by you to the rules prescribed for the amendment of the new system”). 
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII (declaring unanimous consent of the states 
necessary for amending the Articles). 
15 Cf. HART, supra note 7, at 88–91.  
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existing legal system and usually subject to that system’s coordinated 
moves to suppress. In the meantime, we have reason to recognize that our 
existing sub-optimal law and government are real. Most decent human 
beings in most mass societies throughout human history have lived their 
whole lives in conformity to law and government that were not 
“appropriate” sources of guidance if “appropriate” implies more moral 
support than that which comes from being customary. Most human mass 
societies have spent most of their history under the thumbs of successive 
strongmen who were mediocre or worse. They did so, as David Hume 
observed in his famous demolition of social contract theories, because 
“they were born to such an obedience.”19 They went with the best path of 
life that they could see, drawing value from the way law lets us live 
together even when our leaders are bad. Their choice to conform did not 
depend on their being convinced of their leaders’ appropriateness. Having 
a virtuous and credible backstory is neither necessary nor sufficient for a 
legal system and government. Good stories, whether credible or incredible, 
may help motivate conformity, but mainly by cluing us into what others 
are likely to do and to expect, as we hear them retelling those stories.  
Hart’s contrast between law and the demands of a bank-robbing 
gunman is sharpened by the ad hoc, arbitrary character of such a gunman’s 
actions.20 Law’s distinctive contribution to our lives is to make our 
relations with one another less ad hoc, more predictable, and so let us live 
together in large groups. But there is no necessary contrast at all between 
the morality of individual governing actions and the morality of bank 
robbing. Often enough, so-called “authoritarian” leaders are gunmen; 
criminal gangs do run whole nations. Nonetheless, those nations have law; 
those gangs are government. That understanding is part and parcel of legal 
positivism—what’s legal isn’t necessarily what’s moral.  
What makes people leaders is the fact of following. What makes their 
words law is their actual success in expressing what people in their 
community are likely to do and to expect. Of course we would rather have 
good leaders than bad ones, but good or bad, people are lawgivers if their 
community in fact treats their words as law. Whether lawgivers came to 
power in good ways or bad, and whether their acts of purported lawgiving 
are morally justified or not, their words are law for us if and only if enough 
people in our community understand and expect them to be law. Our 
ever-present reason to care about law is not that we owe something to 
lawgivers, but that we need law’s help to live together. We read law not to 
understand lawgivers. We read law to understand one another, to learn how 
                                                                                                                     
19 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 548 (L. A. Selby-Bigge ed., Clarendon Press 
1888) (1740) (for reference in other editions of this work, this citation may be found in book III, part II, 
section VIII). 
20 HART, supra note 7, at 19–25, 82–85, 281.  
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life is likely to be in our community. And that fact tells us where to look 
for law’s meaning.  
The understanding we need when we read law is not what lawgivers 
intended, but what our community understands its law to be. We do not 
need our lawgivers even to intend to be lawgivers. They could be as 
reluctant to fulfill the role as the hapless protagonist in Monty Python’s 
Life of Brian or as insensible to our circumstances as was the Emperor 
Justinian to the European communities that, centuries later, latched onto 
the Corpus Juris Civilis.21 What we need is a vehicle for shared 
understanding across our community and over time about how our life 
together is going to be. And for that, we need law to have a public 
meaning.  
IV. AUTHORITY, LEGITIMACY, AND NORMATIVE FORCE 
Our deployment of the words authority and legitimacy often slides, 
sometimes even within a sentence, between use as a synonym for what is 
truly law and government and use to describe the source of what is truly 
law and government. Synonymous uses will always be with us, but do not 
really add to arguments about what morally justifies trying to make or 
follow law. If we are saying that an act of purported governing is outside 
authority or illegitimate in the synonymous sense of not in conformity with 
existing law, then we are not really adding to calling it illegal. The moral 
merits of that illegal act turn on whether, all things considered, it is morally 
justified—whether moral reasons for that actor in that situation to conform 
to existing law were outweighed by moral reasons to do differently.  
Behind an intentionalist intuition about legal meaning may lie a 
different usage of authority and legitimacy, the one for which the words 
first appeared, namely, a reference to the true source of law and 
government. The words authority and legitimacy come from a framework 
for thinking about law and lawgiving that is wholly incompatible with a 
conventionalist account. The old account conceived of law and government 
as real if and only if they came from persons who had moral rights to rule, 
moral rights to be followed. It denied the descriptions “law” and 
“government” to power dynamics unsupported by such moral rights. The 
old account saw those moral rights as preemptive—the source of the one 
true answer to who was lawgiver and who was not, as morally compelling 
of obedience and as exclusionary of reasons for doing differently as the 
divine command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.22 And, of course, if what 
                                                                                                                     
21 See generally MONTY PYTHON’S LIFE OF BRIAN (HandMade Films & Python (Monty) Pictures 
1979); EMPEROR JUSTINIAN I, CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS (565 CE). 
22 Genesis 22. See LAURENCE CLAUS, LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN UNDERSTANDING ch. 3 
(2012). 
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made words law was the moral right of their issuer to be obeyed, then the 
search for their meaning could naturally be understood as a search for the 
issuer’s intention. Alleging such moral rights to rule made sense only 
because of their purported pedigree, as direct delegations of property rights 
over humans from the creator or creators of humans. When the 
Enlightenment debunked divine right accounts of law and government, it 
left us still saddled with some of the linguistic and conceptual baggage of 
the discredited old idea, yet no one then or since has come up with a 
satisfactory substitute source of preemptive rights to rule.23 Social contract 
notoriously does not fill the void, both empirically and because 
promise-keeping is a good of obviously only finite and relative weight, 
certainly not always the right thing to do. And Razian epistemic authority 
is neither about having rights to be followed nor a source of the reliably 
continuous moral guidance that the old preemptive idea was supposed to 
supply.24 We follow law not because we owe moral duties of “allegiance” 
to lawgivers; we follow law because we owe moral duties to one another as 
people living together in community. In that moral conversation, the one 
we actually have now, authority and legitimacy serve no function beyond 
synonymity with what is truly law and government. We do sometimes 
encounter the word “illegitimacy” being thrown around loosely in political 
discourse to condemn attempts at leadership that are argued to be morally 
unjustified; the value in calling such attempts illegitimate, not just bad, lies 
in raising doubt about whether the purported leader’s acts are truly law and 
government.  
Joseph Raz asserts that “since the law claims to have authority it is 
capable of having it.”25 Echoing David Hume’s “because every one thinks 
so,”26 Raz observes that our legal institutional rhetoric is replete with 
authority claims and he rejects the possibility that those claims could be 
“normally insincere or based on a conceptual mistake.”27 Yet we have 
                                                                                                                     
23 CLAUS, supra note 22. 
24 Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 80 (1986) (describing “a piece-meal approach to 
the question of the authority of governments”).  
25 JOSEPH RAZ, Authority, Law, and Morality, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE 
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 210, 217 (1995).  
26 HUME, supra note 19, at 547 (for reference in other editions of A TREATISE OF HUMAN 
NATURE, this citation may be found in book III, part II, section VIII) (“[I]t being certain, that there is a 
moral obligation to submit to government, because every one thinks so; it must be as certain, that this 
obligation arises not from a promise, since no one, whose judgment has not been led astray by too strict 
adherence to a system of philosophy, has ever yet dreamt of ascribing it to that origin.”). 
27 RAZ, supra note 25, at 217 (“[O]ne cannot sincerely claim that someone who is conceptually 
incapable of having authority has authority if one understands the nature of one’s claim and of the 
person of whom it is made. If I say that trees have authority over people, you will know that either my 
grasp of the concepts of authority or of trees is deficient or that I am trying to deceive (or, of course, 
that I am not really stating that trees have authority but merely pretending to do so, or that I am 
play-acting, etc.). That is enough to show that since the law claims to have authority it is capable of 
having it. Since the claim is made by legal officials wherever a legal system is in force, the possibility 
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abundant historical evidence that they were and are. That rhetoric is a relic 
of a formerly pervasive but fundamentally false conception, exemplified by 
the dieu et mon droit motto that still adorns the British monarch’s coat of 
arms. That rhetoric comes from a creationist vision of human life that we 
have in other respects discarded. It is no argument against evolutionary 
accounts of human life that we long went without them. The ubiquity of 
the old rhetoric is explained by the former ubiquity of the old conception, 
which is in turn explained by its easy assimilation within a creationist 
world view and by the self-interest of powerful incumbents. Our language 
has not caught up to our reasoning, and the defunct moral framework to 
which it risks misdirecting us has the potential to send us in search of 
something we do not always need—lawgiver intent—and to divert us from 
directly seeking that which is indispensable to law’s success, namely, 
shared understanding of a public meaning.  
Fallback attempts to salvage an idea of authority as source of law may 
frame it as a source of merely presumptive, defeasible duties to obey. Such 
attempts might add value if they could demarcate a zone in which 
lawgivers and law receivers can both know ex ante that lawgivers will be 
morally justified in issuing laws and law receivers will be morally required 
to follow laws. But there is no such zone. Each human action—of 
lawgiving and of law following—is a separate, individualized moment of 
all-things-considered moral judgment. From the lawgiver’s perspective, 
doing particular acts that are likely to succeed in lawgiving may or may not 
be the right thing to do whether or not the lawgiver came to power in a 
good way. And for the rest of us, following law on particular occasions 
may or may not be the right thing to do whether or not the lawgiver was 
morally justified in doing the acts that made that law and whether or not 
the lawgiver came to power in a good way. What’s the point of an 
“authority” that is not coextensive with the claimant’s power, and not clear 
ex ante about its own extent, and not in itself the answer to when we 
should follow? Speaking of authority as the source of law also obfuscates 
why we should follow, and where we should look for law’s meaning. 
Asserting a content-independent prima facie duty to defer to authority 
invokes a false correlativity to phantom lawgiver rights. The truth to which 
defeasible duty talk points is simply that when we live inside legal 
systems, we have a strong moral reason to maintain them, and that reason 
                                                                                                                     
that it is normally insincere or based on a conceptual mistake is ruled out. It may, of course, be 
sometimes insincere or based on conceptual mistakes. But at the very least in the normal case the fact 
that the law claims authority for itself shows that it is capable of having authority. Why cannot legal 
officials and institutions be conceptually confused? One answer is that while they can be occasionally 
they cannot be systematically confused. For given the centrality of legal institutions in our structures of 
authority, their claims and conceptions are formed by and contribute to our concept of authority. It is 
what it is in part as a result of the claims and conceptions of legal institutions.”). 
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points us to following our law unless we have stronger moral reasons to do 
differently. So why not just say that? 
Sometimes we hear it said that the law claims authority. That may just 
be shorthand for saying that lawgivers claim authority.28 On any occasion 
that the saying involves a real retreat from lawgivers to the law itself, it is 
in substance to retreat from talking about authority as source of law to 
talking about authority as synonym for law. We might as well say that the 
law claims to be law. Once we acknowledge the essentially customary, 
conventional character of our legal systems, we can see that what makes 
them work is not our incanting ancient fictions, but our attending to each 
other. We have law “because every one thinks so,”29 and it is an 
evolutionary account, not moral duties to lawgivers, that shows us how that 
can be. Shared expectations shape action. The way that lets us live together 
gives us moral reason to do as expected. What we have that moral reason 
to follow is the law as our community understands it. Law is real only if it 
succeeds in expressing to us our customs. Nothing can express to us our 
customs unless it has a public meaning. When we look to words for law, 
we are looking for their public meaning.30  
The word normativity has at its heart an ambiguity perhaps designed to 
bridge the gulf between moral skeptics and moral realists, an ambiguity 
between what is normal and what is moral. We have moral reason to care 
about what is normal for us in the sense of what is custom for us. That 
reason is one of finite and relative weight; it never morally preempts our 
consideration of reasons to do differently. 
V. THE VALUE OF LAWGIVER INTENT 
Public meaning is built into the concept of law. Without public 
meaning, we are without law. When a legal system calls upon its dispute 
resolvers to resolve real doubts about law’s meaning, the system is 
effectively requiring those agents to create public meaning. In doing so, 
dispute resolvers strive to treat the law in dispute as the product of a 
rational mind—coherent, not self-contradictory—where that is possible, 
because being such a product is necessary to fulfilling law’s function of 
helping us live together, not because the lawgiver was in fact rational. If 
the lawgiver was mentally checked out, with no actual understanding of 
what he was signing up to, we would still try to treat his words as the 
product of a rational mind. Understanding the actual workings of his mind 
                                                                                                                     
28 Id. at 215–20. 
29 HUME, supra note 19, at 547 (for reference in other editions of A TREATISE OF HUMAN 
NATURE, this citation may be found in book III, part II, section VIII). 
30 See also Laurence Claus, Law’s Evolution and Human Understanding, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
953 (2014) (responding to commentaries from conference on LAW’S EVOLUTION AND HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING (2012)).  
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is not the primary reason we read his words—we read them not for what 
they tell us about him, but for what they tell us about our practices, about 
how our life together is going to be. Nonetheless, there may be 
circumstances in which dispute resolvers will have morally weighty 
reasons to defer to cogent evidence of lawgiver intent. One such reason 
may be lawgiver expertise on the issue that the law addresses. Another 
may be popular opinion about what the law should be, reflected in the 
lawmaking process.  
To isolate expertise as a reason for deference, imagine a scenario 
where the initial lawgiver is an unelected regulation-writing official and 
the dispute resolver is an elected court. Let us assume that the 
administration in which the official operates is wholly unelected—that its 
members are a self-selecting elite, like some boards of trustees, and are not 
accountable to any elected officials other than the dispute-resolving court. 
In this way, we can exclude the moral significance of popular will from the 
analysis. When we do this, we can see that the moral significance of the 
initial lawgiver’s intention derives only from whatever relative expertise 
the initial lawgiver has about what legal content would be best. The moral 
reason to give weight to evidence of lawgiver intention when resolving real 
disputes about legal meaning would only be deference to expertise. If the 
initial lawgiver had no greater expertise than the dispute-resolving court, 
then there would be no reason for the court to care about his intention at 
all, and the court could justifiably proceed to decide what law would be 
best within the zone of genuine dispute, completely heedless of evidence 
about the initial lawgiver’s intention. And, of course, even if the initial 
lawgiver had morally significant expertise, that consideration would 
remain a reason of finite and relative weight, susceptible to being 
outweighed by other moral considerations.  
Now let us move to a situation where the initial lawgiver was elected, 
or was the public at large voting in a referendum or plebiscite. Now we 
may see moral reasons for caring about lawgiver intention that are our 
reasons for valuing democracy, particularly if the lawgiver was following 
through on promises that recently got her elected or the public that spoke is 
today’s public. Popular support may point to a particular meaning of law 
because popular support figured in and helped morally justify the act of 
attempting to make that law, even though popular support is neither always 
sufficient, nor always necessary, to justify attempts to make law, and even 
though what turns attempts to make law into law is whether We the People 
follow it, not whether we favor it. If we do follow, the understanding we 
show in our following constitutes law’s meaning. If we disagree among 
ourselves about what law means, the fact its adoption had public support 
might help resolve the dispute. Dispute resolvers may conclude that cogent 
evidence of lawgiver intention should settle the doubt about what 
democratic action accomplished. The challenge in such circumstances lies 
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less in seeing value in lawgiver intention than in finding evidence of 
intention that is genuinely cogent.  
In asking whether we have cogent evidence of a group intent, we 
cannot assume even that participants in a lawmaking act share an intent to 
change the substance of the law.31 It is not perverse or irrational for 
participants in a legislative process to intend to offset and effectively 
neutralize each other’s initiatives, or to placate constituencies through 
changes in law’s words that are not really intended to change what will 
happen on the ground. If a new post-Arab Spring national constitution in 
the Middle East both promises more about the applicability of Sharia law 
and promises more about women’s rights, the net result might be a wash. 
Maybe some delegates, maybe even many delegates, intended to maintain 
the status quo; maybe not. Given the competing pressures to which 
legislators are subject, there may well be acts of legislation for which the 
actual intent of some or most or all of the legislators was to introduce a 
mollifying linguistic substitute that is really just another way of saying 
what the law always was. It would be quite wrong for an adjudicative body 
to infer that the change in words was necessarily intended by the legislators 
to produce a change in substance and that vagueness or ambiguity in the 
words should be resolved accordingly in favor of substantive legal change.  
VI. ORIGINAL MEANING VERSUS PRECEDENT 
Finding law’s source in custom rather than authority clarifies not only 
where we should look for law’s meaning, but also what counts as our 
current law. If a court holds that a law means something different from that 
law’s existing public meaning, what is our law now?32 Once we see that 
the distinctively legal reason to care about law’s meaning is the value of 
settled expectations, not of deference to authority, we can see that when a 
revolutionary reading catches on—when we are beyond the tipping point 
and the revolutionary reading has become the new expression of our 
customs—then the legal reason to care about public meaning now supports 
maintaining the precedent as the new existing public meaning. Arguing for 
a return to original public meaning in such circumstances is like arguing 
for a return to the Articles of Confederation because the Constitution’s 
adoption did not conform to that existing law. An attempt to distinguish 
might invoke Madison’s defense to claim that the Constitution’s adoption 
was the will of the people33 and past court decisions are not. Yet as we 
                                                                                                                     
31 Cf. generally RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012).  
32 For a thorough survey of the existing literature on the relation of originalist theory and 
precedent, see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning Approach, 33 
CONST. COMMENT. 451 (2018) (reviewing RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF 
PRECEDENT (2017)). 
33 “The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties 
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have seen, the actual mechanism by which constitutions and court 
decisions become our law is exactly the same, namely, through their 
successful eliciting of shared expectations that they will hereafter express 
what is custom for us. What stories we tell ourselves to get to new customs 
varies, but once we have new expressions of custom, we have new law.  
Revolutionary behavior may or may not be morally justified. Either 
way, if it is successful, we are highly likely to tell ourselves that it was 
justified, because it now supplies our law. Revolutionary behavior by 
courts is unlikely to be forthright about its revolutionary character, but it is 
not obvious that disingenuous claims of faithful interpretation are less 
morally defensible than overt disregard, which would pose greater danger 
of destabilizing the system. Judicial mini revolutions may release pressure 
for legal change that could otherwise grow to threaten the legal system 
much more profoundly. Of course if we think judicial precedents have 
changed our law to be worse, we may seek to overturn them, but they will 
still be our law in the meantime.  
CONCLUSION: WHY WE READ 
As Richard Kay observes, finding the meaning of rules cannot be 
disconnected from the reason we “care about those rules in the first 
place.”34 A quest to discover meaning is a quest for understanding. A quest 
to understand a human communication is a quest to understand humans. 
But which humans? For most of our messages, the answer is, quite 
obviously, the authors. We read our love letters and work email and texts 
from friends to understand the people who are writing to us. Is that why we 
read law? It would be if lawgivers had a right to our obedience. 
Understanding their will for our lives would then be our reason for caring 
about their words. But that is not why we care about law. We care about 
law because it lets us live together in large communities. We care about 
law because it lets us live fuller and better lives than we could ever do 
without it. We care about law because it lets us understand each other. Law 
does this because it expresses the customs we share. Law does this because 
its sayings self-fulfill. All this, law accomplishes if, and only if, it has a 
public meaning that brings us together. 
 
                                                                                                                     
were got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bills of rights, 
that first principles might be resorted to.” 2 RECORDS, supra note 14, at 476 (Madison’s notes recording 
proceedings of the Convention on August 31, 1787). 
34 Kay, supra note 1, at 714. 
